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I. Introduction 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission,1 the United States Supreme Court overruled a 
finding that a religious baker had violated a state 
antidiscrimination law when refusing to create a wedding cake for 
a same-sex couple.2 The decision might seem to have been a 
masterful resolution of an extremely difficult case because the 
Court issued a narrow opinion that seemed to affirm free exercise 
rights while at the same time affirming the right of same-sex 
couples to marry.3 Yet, the opinion, along with the accompanying 
                                                                                                     
  Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, 
Ohio. 
 1. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 2. See id. at 1748 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“If that freedom is to maintain 
its vitality, reasoning like the Colorado Court of Appeals’ must be rejected.”). 
 3. See id. at 1747–48 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the right for 
same-sex couples to marry had and will continue to conflict with individuals’ right 
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concurrences and dissent, may well destabilize various settled 
areas of constitutional law and, in any event, likely represents 
shots across the bow with respect to a number of issues that will 
make their way before the Court. 
Part II of this Article discusses Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
explaining some of the contradictory signals contained within it 
and why this opinion may prove to be much more significant than 
many commentators seem to appreciate. Part III discusses some of 
the ways that the decision may modify First Amendment law and 
may undermine antidiscrimination protections as a general 
matter. The Article concludes that the Masterpiece Cakeshop 
holding permitted the Court to put off for another day resolution 
of some of the very thorny issues that may arise when sincere 
religious convictions are in conflict with antidiscrimination laws. 
Many of the implicit views and approaches contained within 
Masterpiece Cakeshop suggest that future opinions will be at best 
quite contentious and at worst insupportable as a matter of reason 
or precedent.4 
II. Masterpiece and Mixed Messaging 
Masterpiece Cakeshop is a narrow opinion that seems to affirm 
free exercise rights while at the same time affirming the right of 
same-sex couples to marry.5 Yet, the opinion has the potential to 
help bring about significant changes in existing law—the bases for 
these important deviations are found not in the holding itself but 
in the factors that the Court implicitly endorses for consideration 
and in the implicit roles that these factors should play in future 
cases.6 While the Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion does not change 
                                                                                                     
to freedom of speech and expression). 
 4. See infra Part IV (discussing potential dystopian results of the case). 
 5. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1747–48 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(stating that the Court’s previous decision granting same-sex couples the right to 
marry has inevitably come into conflict with religious liberty). 
 6. See id. at 1723 (noting certain factors that might be different from a 
refusal to sell a cake). 
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current law, it nonetheless bodes poorly for a reasoned resolution 
of the difficult issues such cases may present. 
A. Background 
When Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins asked Jack Phillips 
about creating a cake to help them celebrate their wedding, he 
refused, citing religious opposition to same-sex marriage.7 Phillips, 
a devout Christian,8 believes that “creating a wedding cake for a 
same-sex wedding would be equivalent to participating in a 
celebration that is contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs.”9 
Craig and Mullins then filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission against Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips, 
alleging that that the bakery had denied them “‘full and equal 
service’ . . . because of their sexual orientation.”10 
Colorado has an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in 
places of public accommodation.11 The act defines “‘public 
accommodation’ broadly to include any ‘place of business engaged 
in any sales to the public and any place offering services . . . to the 
public,’ but excludes ‘a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place 
that is principally used for religious purposes.’”12 
An investigator found that Phillips had refused to make 
wedding cakes for six other same-sex couples13 because “his 
                                                                                                     
 7. See id. at 1723 (“In 2012 a same-sex couple visited Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, a bakery in Colorado, to make inquiries about ordering a cake for their 
wedding reception. The shop's owner told the couple that he would not create a 
cake for their wedding because of his religious opposition to same-sex 
marriages . . . .”). 
 8. See id. at 1724 (explaining that Phillips’s main goal in life is to be 
obedient to Jesus Christ). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1725. 
 11. See COLO. REV. STAT.§ 24–34–601(2)(a) (2017) 
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or 
indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, 
because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital 
status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of 
a place of public accommodation . . . . 
 12. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1725 (2018) (citing COLO. REV. STAT.§ 24–34–601(1)). 
 13. See id. at 1726 (“The investigation found that Phillips had declined to 
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religious beliefs prohibited it and because the potential customers 
‘were doing something illegal’ at that time.”14 The investigator also 
found that Phillips had refused to sell cupcakes to two lesbians who 
were going to celebrate a commitment ceremony15 because the shop 
“had a policy of not selling baked goods to same-sex couples for this 
type of event.”16 Thus, the bakery represented itself as having a 
policy of refusing to sell to those celebrating same-sex unions, 
because of the bakery’s religious beliefs that such unions merited 
disapprobation and, perhaps, because such unions were “illegal.”17 
Craig and Mullins were doing something illegal only in the 
sense that Colorado did not recognize same-sex marriage at that 
time.18 It was not against Colorado law for the couple to go to 
Massachusetts to marry and then to have a subsequent reception 
in Denver,19 just as it was not illegal for the unnamed lesbian 
couple to have a commitment ceremony in Colorado.20 Nonetheless, 
Colorado, at that time, did have a constitutional provision barring 
recognition of same-sex unions.21 
It is not clear why the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court expressly 
noted that such marriages were not recognized at the time that 
Phillips refused to make the cake.22 The Court may have done so 
                                                                                                     
sell custom wedding cakes to about six other same-sex couples.”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. at 1725–26 (describing that Phillips explained to multiple 
potential customers that he could not sell cakes to them because their sexual 
orientation and lifestyle was illegal and against his religious beliefs). 
 18. See id. at 1723 (“[T]he State of Colorado itself did not recognize [same-sex 
marriages] at that time.”). 
 19. See id. at 1724 (“At that time, Colorado did not recognize same-sex 
marriages, so the couple planned to wed legally in Massachusetts and afterwards 
to host a reception for their family and friends in Denver.”). 
 20. See id. at 1723 (noting that Colorado did not recognize same-sex 
marriages). 
 21. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31 (“Only a union of one man and 
one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this state.”), held 
unconstitutional by Brinkman v. Long, No. 2013-CV-032572, 2014 WL 7722910 
(Colo. Dist. Ct. July 9, 2014). 
 22. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1721 (“His dilemma was 
understandable in 2012, which was before Colorado recognized the validity of gay 
MASTERPIECE OF MISDIRECTION? 967 
because Phillips implied that the state’s refusal to recognize such 
unions played a role in his refusal23 or, perhaps, because the Court 
believed that the state’s refusal to recognize same-sex unions 
undercut the claim that Phillips was motivated by impermissible 
animus and supported his belief that his refusal was not precluded 
by law.24 Whether or not the existence of such a law would in fact 
negate the presence of animus,25 same-sex marriage is now 
recognized in Colorado and all of the other states,26 so this factor 
would not operate in the same way if a bakery were to deny such 
services now. 
B. First Amendment Implications? 
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court explained that the case 
“presents difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation of at 
least two principles.”27 The first of the named principles involved 
“the authority of a State and its governmental entities to protect 
the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, 
married but who face discrimination when they seek goods or 
services.”28 The second principle involved “the right of all persons 
to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment, as 
                                                                                                     
marriages . . . .”). 
 23. See id. at 1724 (“Phillips explained that he does not create wedding cakes 
for same-sex weddings because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage, 
and also because Colorado (at that time) did not recognize same-sex marriages.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 24. See id. at 1728  
Since the State itself did not allow those marriages to be performed in 
Colorado, there is some force to the argument that the baker was not 
unreasonable in deeming it lawful to decline to take an action that he 
understood to be an expression of support for their validity when that 
expression was contrary to his sincerely held religious beliefs . . . . 
 25. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down Colorado’s 
state constitutional amendment barring antidiscrimination protections on the 
basis of sexual orientation because the amendment “seem[ed] inexplicable by 
anything but animus toward the class it affects”). 
 26. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (striking down 
same-sex marriage bans as a violation of 14th Amendment guarantees). 
 27. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
 28. Id. 
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applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”29 Yet, 
this was a somewhat misleading way to begin for at least two 
distinct reasons: first, it was not even clear whether or how the 
First Amendment was triggered in this case, and, second, because 
the Court did not offer a helpful way to reconcile these principles 
besides offering some factors that “might”30 be considered and 
instead decided the case based on the unobjectionable principle 
that those ultimately adjudicating rights must not be blinded by 
hostility towards one of the parties.31 
The First Amendment freedoms include speech and free 
exercise of religion.32 Speech was arguably implicated in this case, 
even though “few persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake 
might have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected 
speech.”33 If speech can be implicated in cake-making, then an 
important issue involves how to determine when cake-making 
qualifies as protected speech. The Court noted that the general 
failure to appreciate the possible speech elements of cake-making 
might be attributable to the failure to appreciate that “the 
application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen 
our understanding of their meaning,”34 but did little to flesh out 
the conditions under which the creation of baked goods would 
trigger First Amendment scrutiny.35 
Certainly, our understanding of constitutional protections 
may evolve across generations—“[T]imes can blind us to certain 
                                                                                                     
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. at 1732  
Phillips was entitled to a neutral decisionmaker who would give full 
and fair consideration to his religious objection as he sought to assert 
it in all of the circumstances in which this case was presented, 
considered, and decided . . . . [T]he rulings of the Commission and of 
the state court that enforced the Commission’s order must be 
invalidated. 
 32. See id. at 1723 (“The freedoms asserted here are both the freedom of 
speech and the free exercise of religion.”). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. (stating factors that “might” be different from refusal to sell a 
cake with no further explanation). 
MASTERPIECE OF MISDIRECTION? 969 
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”36 Yet, it is also 
true that some “new” contexts may in fact be less novel than 
initially thought and may well be readily analyzed in light of well 
accepted principles and criteria.37 Regrettably, the Court did not 
make clear or even mention whether this “new” understanding of 
what constitutes political speech was compatible with Rumsfeld v. 
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.,38 although that 
case was addressed in Justice Thomas’ concurrence.39 
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court illustrated how thorny some 
of the implicated constitutional issues might be in a case involving 
a baker who claimed that he could not in good conscience bake a 
particular cake40—the Court mentioned several different scenarios 
and then suggested that certain salient features might make a 
constitutional difference.41 “If a baker refused to design a special 
cake with words or images celebrating the marriage—for instance, 
a cake showing words with religious meaning—that might be 
different from a refusal to sell any cake at all.”42 This example was 
offered in the context of explaining that “[i]n defining whether a 
baker’s creation can be protected, these details might make a 
difference.”43 
Regrettably, it is not entirely clear which details of the Court’s 
example might make a difference. Is it that the baker does not 
want to design a special cake with celebratory words or images or 
                                                                                                     
 36. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003). 
 37. Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The 
decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow 
closely on well-accepted principles and criteria.”). 
 38. 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 39. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1744 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[A] reasonable observer would not 
view Phillips’ conduct as ‘an endorsement of same-sex marriage,’ but rather as 
mere ‘compliance’ with Colorado’s public-accommodations law.” (citing Rumsfeld, 
547 U.S. at 64–65)). 
 40. See id. at 1723 (“The shop’s owner told the couple that he would not 
create a cake for their wedding because of his religious opposition to same-sex 
marriage . . . .”). 
 41. See id. (noting a scenario that “might be different from a refusal to sell 
any cake at all.” (emphasis added)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (emphasis added). 
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is it simply that the baker does not have to design a special cake? 
Does it matter that the special cake would be celebrating a 
marriage? Perhaps the baker’s being asked “to use his artistic 
skills to make an expressive statement”44 sufficed to trigger First 
Amendment guarantees. The Court made the proper analysis even 
more confusing when illustrating its speech point by talking about 
words with religious meaning, as if those words might trigger more 
speech protection than other non-religious words that Phillips 
would refuse to endorse. 45 
Ironically, after mentioning particular factors that might be 
constitutionally relevant,46 the Court implied that some of those 
very factors were not constitutionally relevant.47 Apparently, the 
fact that Phillips was being asked to bake a cake did not alone 
immunize his refusal, since the articulated factors might make a 
difference when deciding whether a baker’s “creation” is 
protected.48 But if the presence or absence of additional factors 
would determine whether a creation was protected,49 then the 
mere fact that it was being commissioned or created would not 
alone immunize a refusal to bake a cake from prosecution under 
an antidiscrimination law. 
The Court’s mixed messaging was not limited to its discussion 
of which factors might make a difference. The Court seemed to 
undercut its own implicit position about how to analyze these 
                                                                                                     
 44. Id. at 1728. 
 45. See id. at 1723 (noting that refusal to design a cake showing words with 
religious meaning might be different from Phillips’s instance). 
 46. See id. at 1723 
A baker’s refusal to attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is cut 
the right way, or refusal to put certain religious words or decoration on 
the cake, or even a refusal to sell a cake that has been baked for the 
public generally but includes certain religious words or symbols on it 
are just three examples of possibilities that seem all but endless. 
 47. See id. (stating that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s 
consideration of the case was faulty because “[t]he reason and motive for the 
baker’s refusal were based on his sincere religious beliefs and convictions”). 
 48. See id. (“In defining whether a baker’s creation can be protected, these 
details might make a difference.”). 
 49. See id. (noting that the presence of certain factors might distinguish 
future cases). 
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kinds of cases when one considers the Court’s reasoning in light of 
the underlying facts. 
Phillips had refused to bake a cake when he understood what 
Craig and Mullins were celebrating50—there had been no 
exploration of what would be on the cake,51 which means that none 
of the possibly significant factors such as celebratory words or 
images52 played a role in this case. Further, there is reason to 
believe that Phillips would have been unwilling to provide any 
kind of cake, e.g., a large sheet cake, for the celebration of Craig 
and Mullins’s marriage, “because the shop ‘had a policy of not 
selling baked goods to same-sex couples for this type of event.’”53 
The Court noted Phillips’s admission that “if a baker refused 
to sell any goods or any cakes for gay weddings, . . . the State would 
have a strong case under this Court’s precedents that this would 
be a denial of goods and services that went beyond any protected 
rights of a baker who offers goods and services to the general 
public.”54 Yet, the bakery did have such a policy,55 so it would seem 
that Phillips admitted that the State had a strong case that 
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s practices were in violation of Colorado 
law. 
A case involving a bakery with a blanket policy against 
providing baked goods for same-sex weddings might be contrasted 
with a narrower case involving a baker who refuses to provide a 
specially designed cake “us[ing] his artistic skills to make an 
expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in his own voice and 
of his own creation.”56 The Court’s having mentioned these 
differing scenarios implicitly distinguishes between an 
                                                                                                     
 50. See id. (explaining that Phillips refused to bake the case when he learned 
it was for a same-sex wedding). 
 51. See id. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Craig and Mullins simply 
requested a wedding cake: They mentioned no message or anything else 
distinguishing the cake they wanted to buy from any other wedding cake Phillips 
would have sold.”). 
 52. See id. at 1723 (noting potentially distinguishable factors of a refusal to 
attend the wedding to cut the cake, lace religious words on the cake, or sell an 
already created cake displaying religious symbols). 
 53. Id. at 1725. 
 54. Id. at 1728. 
 55. See id. at 1726 (noting that the shop “had a policy of not selling baked 
goods to same-sex couples for this type of event”). 
 56. Id. at 1728. 
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impermissible refusal to provide any goods or cakes with a possibly 
permissible refusal to make an expressive statement with which 
one disagrees. 
Assume for purposes of illustration that the following 
accurately represents current law. The Constitution protects 
Baker’s conscience-based refusal to create a wedding cake that 
includes the writing: “God blesses the union of Charles and David.” 
However, a blanket refusal to bake any cake for a same-sex union 
is not constitutionally protected. 
Charles and David approach Baker seeking a cake with “God 
blesses the union of Charles and David” written on it. Baker 
refuses pursuant to the bakery’s general policy of refusing to 
provide any baked goods for same-sex unions. At least one question 
would be whether Baker’s refusal would be permissible because a 
different baker would be constitutionally protected in refusing to 
provide such a cake, given her willingness to provide other baked 
goods for Charles and David; for example, a wedding cake with no 
writing on it, or whether instead Baker’s refusal would not be 
constitutionally protected because pursuant to a policy of refusing 
to provide any baked goods for same-sex weddings. 
In the hypothesized example where Charles and David supply 
the words that they would like Baker to incorporate, it is unclear 
whether this counts as an example of a refusal to “use his artistic 
skills to make an expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in 
his own voice and of his own creation.”57 The words would not be 
Baker’s, but the design of the cake would be and, further, Baker 
would be using his own artistic skills to make the cake. It is simply 
unclear whether this should count as Baker’s expressive 
statement—if a baker is asked to design a cake with the words, 
“Happy Birthday, Grandma,” those seeing the cake would be 
unlikely to attribute the message to the baker rather than to 
family members.58 Perhaps Baker’s being asked to write someone 
                                                                                                     
 57. Id. (emphasis added). 
 58. Cf. Shannon Gilreath & Arley Ward, Same-Sex Marriage, Religious 
Accommodation, and the Race Analogy, 41 VT. L. REV. 237, 243 n.27 (2016) 
(“Whatever communicative content is found in ‘happy birthday’ in frosting is quite 
obviously attributable to the person who bought and gave the cake, not to the 
baker . . . .”). 
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else’s words would nonetheless count as a wedding endorsement in 
his own voice. Suppose, however, that Charles and David request 
a wedding cake with no symbols or writing—that, presumably, 
would be less likely to qualify as an endorsement in Baker’s own 
voice. 
There are numerous ways to modify the hypothetical about 
Charles and David’s wedding cake to tease out the (possibly) 
relevant point along the continuum past the blanket refusal to 
create baked goods for a same-sex wedding where the refusal 
would be constitutionally protected. However, regardless of where 
that point along the continuum might be, the Court implied that a 
baker would not be protected merely because he, himself, believed 
that “creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding [regardless 
of what letters or symbols it contained] would be equivalent to 
participating in a celebration that is contrary to his own most 
deeply held beliefs.”59 
It may be that the Court did not believe that the Masterpiece 
Cakeshop had a blanket policy of refusing to provide baked goods 
for same-sex unions statement to that effect notwithstanding,60 
because Phillips had told Mullins and Craig, “I’ll make your 
birthday cakes, shower cakes, sell you cookies and brownies, I just 
don’t make cakes for same-sex weddings.”61 Phillips’s comment 
when taken in light of the articulated refusal to provide baked 
goods for same-sex unions “reads more naturally”62 as a suggestion 
that Craig and Mullins should come back when they want baked 
goods for a different occasion.63 But it is not at all clear why the 
bakery’s willingness to provide baked goods for another occasion 
would be relevant to whether their refusal to provide baked goods 
                                                                                                     
 59. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1728 (2018). 
 60. See id. at 1726 (noting that the shop had a policy of not selling to 
same-sex couples). 
 61. Id. at 1724. 
 62. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012). 
 63. Presumably, the bakery’s willingness to provide cakes for a shower 
referred to a baby shower. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724 (explaining 
Phillips’s offer to make the couple “shower cakes”). If the bakery was unwilling to 
provide baked goods for a commitment ceremony, it was likely unwilling to 
provide a cake for a bridal shower or grooms cake, although these possibilities 
were not discussed in the opinion. See id. (stating that Phillips “just [doesn’t] 
make cakes for same sex weddings”). 
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to Mullins and Craig for their wedding was in violation of law. 
Nonetheless, the Court took issue with the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission for its conclusion that the bakery’s willingness to 
provide Craig and Mullins a birthday cake was somehow 
irrelevant.64 
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court seemed to be trying to find 
some kind of compromise position. The Court noted that “[w]hen it 
comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a member of the clergy 
who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious grounds could 
not be compelled to perform the ceremony without denial of his or 
her right to the free exercise of religion.”65 Such a “refusal would 
be well understood in our constitutional order as an exercise of 
religion.”66 However, the Court cautioned that 
[I]f that exception were not confined, then a long list of persons 
who provide goods and services for marriages and weddings 
might refuse to do so for gay persons, thus resulting in a 
community-wide stigma inconsistent with the history and 
dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods, 
services, and public accommodations.67 
In a case addressing a baker’s conscience-based refusal on the 
merits, 
any decision in favor of the baker would have to be sufficiently 
constrained, lest all purveyors of goods and services who object 
to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in effect be 
allowed to put up signs saying ‘no goods or services will be sold 
if they will be used for gay marriages,’ something that would 
impose a serious stigma on gay persons.68 
Regrettably, the Court did not provide a helpful way to limit 
the exemption claims that might be made by any number of 
commercial entities, besides offering the bald statement that 
“there are no doubt innumerable goods and services that no one 
                                                                                                     
 64. See id. at 1730 (“[T]he Commission dismissed Phillips’ willingness to sell 
‘birthday cakes, shower cakes, [and] cookies and brownies,’ . . . to gay and lesbian 
customers as irrelevant.”). 
 65. Id. at 1727. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1728–29. 
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could argue implicate the First Amendment.”69 Ironically, the 
Court offered a way for almost anyone to argue that the First 
Amendment was triggered by their refusal to provide goods or 
services for a same-sex wedding.70 
The Court mentioned Phillips’s claim that he was being asked 
“to use his artistic skills to make an expressive statement, a 
wedding endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation,”71 
which Phillips alleged was in effect “a demand for him to exercise 
the right of his own personal expression for their message, a 
message he could not express in a way consistent with his religious 
beliefs.”72 But many different types of individuals commissioned to 
perform a service requiring some kind of skill might claim, even 
sincerely, that they were being asked to use their creative talents 
to provide services for a wedding in a way that would be 
inconsistent with their religious beliefs73—the Court offered 
nothing to limit the “purveyors of goods and services who object to 
gay marriages for moral and religious reasons . . . [who must] be 
allowed to put up signs saying ‘no goods or services will be sold if 
they will be used for gay marriages.’”74 
Nor did the Court’s suggestive comments75 imply that the 
envisioned exception would only apply to those providing 
commissioned services. Suppose that a bakery makes several cakes 
each morning with the expression, “May God’s countenance shine 
upon you,”76 because the bakery has enough demand for such cakes 
                                                                                                     
 69. Id. at 1728. 
 70. See id. (determining that Phillips was not required to use his personal 
expression to spread a message inconsistent with his religious beliefs). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) 
(discussing that a photographer refused to provides service for a couple 
celebrating a same-sex union); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 549 
(Wash. 2017) (stating that a florist refused to provide floral arrangement for a 
same-sex union), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018). 
 74. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1728–29 (2018). 
 75. See id. at 1728 (refusing to demand that Phillips use his right to 
expression to promote a belief he does not hold). 
 76. See id. at 1723 (offering the example of a baker who refuses “to sell a 
cake that has been baked for the public generally but includes certain religious 
words or symbols on it”). 
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that it does not need to wait for special orders. Suppose further 
that the bakery has a policy of refusing to sell such cakes to those 
celebrating same-sex unions or, perhaps, to those in same-sex 
relationships. It is simply unclear whether the Court would 
consider this religious message to be a factor in favor of those 
asserting a conscientious objection when refusing a sale, even 
though the cake had not been specially ordered. Nor is it clear that 
this exception would be limited to those in same-sex relationships. 
Those with conscientious objections to interracial unions or 
interreligious unions would presumably be entitled to invoke the 
same kind of exception.77 
Suppose that the cakes do not have religious writing or 
symbols on them. Even so, the baker might believe that her selling 
cakes (or other baked goods) to be used at a celebration of a 
disfavored union would be incompatible with her religious beliefs. 
While the Court suggested that such a refusal would be contrary 
to law,78 the Court offered no way to distinguish between this 
sincere refusal to allow baked goods to be used in a disapproved 
celebration and the sincere religious claim of the individual who 
did not want her artistic skills to be used on a way contrary to 
conscience. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop suggested that it could not sell baked 
goods to those celebrating same-sex unions79 because doing so 
would somehow make the bakery a participant in a celebration in 
violation of conscience. Individuals who disapprove of a variety of 
kinds of families or groups (whether defined in terms of sex, race, 
religion, national origin, or some other category) might 
analogously suggest that their promotion of those families/groups 
in a variety of contexts would be a violation of conscience. Perhaps 
                                                                                                     
 77. Cf. Mark Strasser, Public Policy, Same-Sex Marriage, and Exemptions 
for Matters of Conscience, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 135, 145 (2010) (noting that 
individuals “might have religious qualms about helping any number of couples 
marry, such as interracial, interreligious, or intergenerational couples,” and 
others “might have religious objections to facilitating marriages where the parties 
could not produce children through their union”). 
 78. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (distinguishing certain 
instances of refusing to bake or sell cakes bearing religious symbols). 
 79. See id. at 1726 (noting that the bakery had a policy of refusing to sell to 
same-sex couples). 
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some of those claims could be rejected because the beliefs were not 
sincerely held,80 but many individuals might in fact sincerely hold 
such beliefs. If the Court stands by its claim that “it is a general 
rule that such objections do not allow business owners and other 
actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons 
equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally 
applicable public accommodations law,”81 then the Court will have 
to do much more to limit the conditions under which individuals 
who refuse to serve particular families or groups because of 
religious beliefs are immunized from prosecution under 
antidiscrimination laws.82 Otherwise, the exception (namely, 
whenever an individual has sincere religious compunctions about 
providing the good or service)83 would swallow the rule. 
C. Decisionmaker Bias 
After suggesting a variety of factors that might be considered 
in some future case implicating conscience and the appropriate 
application of an antidiscrimination law,84 the Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Court made clear that it would not address how these 
factors should be applied.85 Instead, the Court focused on whether 
the Commission had possessed the “requisite religious neutrality 
that must be strictly observed”86 when assessing whether Phillips 
had indeed violated the Colorado antidiscrimination law. 
Several factors convinced the Court that Phillips’s claims had 
not been examined with the required neutrality.87 Commission 
                                                                                                     
 80. But see id. at 1729 (criticizing the commissioner for implying that a 
particular religious belief might not have been sincerely held). 
 81. Id. at 1727. 
 82. See id. at 1723 (providing a range of scenarios that might allow 
immunization from prosecution). 
 83. See id. at 1732 (noting that disputes must be resolved with tolerance and 
without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs). 
 84. See id. at 1723 (distinguishing situations involving cakes with religious 
symbols that “might” be different). 
 85. See id. at 1732 (“However later cases raising these or similar concerns 
are resolved in the future . . . .”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. (stating that the State’s interest could have been weighed against 
Phillips’s sincere religious belief in a way consistent with religious neutrality). 
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members had, in the Court’s view, “endorsed the view that 
religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public 
sphere or commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and 
persons are less than fully welcome in Colorado’s business 
community.”88 One Commission member in particular had 
suggested that “Phillips can believe ‘what he wants to believe,’ but 
cannot act on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in 
the state.’”89 
The Court understood that the comments were ambiguous and 
that the commissioner might merely have meant that “a business 
cannot refuse to provide services based on sexual orientation, 
regardless of the proprietor’s personal views.”90 Or, the comments 
“might be seen as inappropriate and dismissive comments showing 
lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free exercise rights and the 
dilemma he faced.”91 
Perhaps the commissioners were biased against Phillips.92 
However, the Court’s claim that the Commission members did not 
manifest “due consideration for Phillips’ free exercise rights and 
the dilemma he faced”93 was not entirely persuasive. It is an open 
question whether Phillips had a free exercise right to refuse to 
provide a cake in the circumstances, so it is at best an open 
question whether any free exercise rights were ignored or 
undervalued. Indeed, the free exercise right that the Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Court seems to be recognizing is the right to have one’s 
claim heard by a neutral decisionmaker94 and to have decisions 
                                                                                                     
 88. Id. at 1729. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (“Standing alone, these statements are susceptible of different 
interpretations.”). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[S]tate actors cannot show 
hostility to religious views; rather, they must give those views ‘neutral and 
respectful consideration.’ . . . I join the Court's opinion in full because I believe 
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did not satisfy that obligation.”). 
 93. Id. at 1729. 
 94. Cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975)  
[A] “fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” 
This applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to 
courts. Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally 
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about one’s rights not be based on improper considerations such as 
bias against one’s religion.95 But the question at hand is whether 
in fact the Commissioners had been motivated by bias in reaching 
the decision rather than in having come to an adverse decision on 
appropriate grounds.96 
What of the dilemma Phillips faced? Nothing is included 
within the opinion that suggests that Phillips was conflicted—he 
believed he had a religious duty to refuse to provide the baked 
goods and may in addition have believed that such a decision was 
in accord with the law because Colorado at the time did not 
recognize same-sex unions.97 It simply is not clear what dilemma 
the Court was envisioning. 
A dilemma might be posed when religious dictates require one 
action and the law requires another, but that dilemma did not 
seem to be present at the time this occurred.98 Perhaps the 
dilemma posed is that religious dictates might later be found to be 
in violation of law, although that kind of dilemma is posed 
whenever one does what one believes right (for religious or 
non-religious reasons) and that decision is subsequently found to 
be in violation of law. 
Depending upon how Phillips’s beliefs were construed, the 
commissioner might merely have been offering the view that 
Phillips himself seemed to have conceded, namely, that Colorado 
law precluded Phillips from issuing a blanket refusal to sell any 
                                                                                                     
unacceptable but “our system of law has always endeavored to prevent 
even the probability of unfairness.” In pursuit of this end, various 
situations have been identified in which experience teaches that the 
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is 
too high to be constitutionally tolerable. 
(citations omitted). 
 95. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1731 (2018) (“[T]he government, if it is to respect the Constitution's 
guarantee of free exercise, cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the 
religious beliefs of affected citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes 
judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices.”). 
 96. See id. (“[T]he Commission was obliged under the Free Exercise Clause 
to proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs.”). 
 97. See id. at 1723 (explaining that the motivation for Phillips’s refusal was 
based on his “sincere religious beliefs and convictions”). 
 98. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text (noting that Phillips 
believed the wedding illegal). 
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baked goods to those wishing to celebrate a same-sex union.99 Yet, 
the questionable commissioner comments were not limited to those 
already mentioned, and it may well be that some of the other 
comments ultimately convinced the Court that the Commission 
members were biased. 
The Court seemed especially affronted100 by the following 
remarks: 
Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all 
kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be 
slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, 
we—we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of 
religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is 
one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use 
to—to use their religion to hurt others.101 
It is not clear whether the Court rejected that religious views 
had been used throughout history to justify discrimination102 or 
whether, instead, the Court believed that religious views had been 
used to justify discrimination103 but that those uses of religion were 
                                                                                                     
 99. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728 
Petitioners conceded, moreover, that if a baker refused to sell any goods 
or any cakes for gay weddings, . . . the State would have a strong case 
under this Court's precedents that this would be a denial of goods and 
services that went beyond any protected rights of a baker who offers 
goods and services to the general public and is subject to a neutrally 
applied and generally applicable public accommodations law. 
 100. See id. at 1729 (“To describe a man's faith as ‘one of the most despicable 
pieces of rhetoric that people can use’ is to disparage his religion in at least two 
distinct ways: by describing it as despicable, and also by characterizing it as 
merely rhetorical—something insubstantial and even insincere.”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See, for example, the Loving Court’s description of the views of the trial 
court judge:  
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, 
and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the 
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such 
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not 
intend for the races to mix. 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967). 
 103. See Michael Kavey, Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment 
Right to Discriminate, 113 YALE L.J. 743, 773 n.150 (2003) (“[R]eligion has been 
used to justify discrimination in all forms.”). 
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not appropriately compared to the use of religion before the 
commission. The Court noted: “The commissioner even went so far 
as to compare Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held religious 
beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust.”104 Such a 
comment suggests that religion has sometimes been used to justify 
indefensible practices but that it is unfair or inappropriate to 
analogize the refusal to provide baked goods to practices involving 
slavery and genocide.105 
The commissioner may not have meant that the practice 
before the Commission was of the same magnitude as slavery and 
genocide but merely that religious beliefs had been used to justify 
a whole host of discriminatory practices. The commissioner said as 
much when suggesting that there were “hundreds of situations 
where freedom of religion has been used to justify 
discrimination.”106 
Suppose that the commissioner had not mentioned slavery or 
the Holocaust but instead had noted that religion had been used in 
the past to justify the refusal to recognize interracial marriage.107 
Presumably, such a comment would not trigger images of the 
horrors of slavery or of gas chambers. However, given the broader 
societal acceptance of interracial marriage,108 such a comment 
might still have been thought prejudicial if, for example, 
interracial marriage were thought religiously acceptable and 
same-sex marriage religiously unacceptable. 
The Court responded to the observation that religion had been 
used to justify discrimination including slavery and the Holocaust 
by saying: “This sentiment is inappropriate for a Commission 
charged with the solemn responsibility of fair and neutral 
                                                                                                     
 104. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. 
 105. Cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Three Concepts of Roles, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
547, 571 (2011) (“It does not help to compare some present injustice with some 
historical norms that we now universally acknowledge as an evil, like slavery.”). 
 106. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. 
 107. Cf. Josephine Ross, The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison of 
Mixed-Race and Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 255, 263 
(2002) (“Opponents of mixed-race marriages, like opponents 
of same-sex marriages today, cited religion and natural law to block acceptance 
of those relationships.”). 
 108. See Kevin Brown, The Enduring Integration School Desegregation 
Helped to Produce, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2017) (“American society’s 
acceptance of interracial dating and marriage has increased significantly.”). 
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enforcement of Colorado’s antidiscrimination law—a law that 
protects against discrimination on the basis of religion as well as 
sexual orientation.”109 But the Court’s response here suggests that 
the difficulty may not have been in comparing the horrors of 
slavery or of the Holocaust to the indignity of having to go to a 
different bakery to get baked goods for one’s wedding celebration, 
but in a commissioner’s having the sentiment that religion may 
have played a role in promoting slavery or the Holocaust. But 
religion has been used to promote slavery,110 although it has been 
used to undermine slavery as well.111 Religion also was used to 
promote the Holocaust,112 although religion may also have inspired 
individuals to oppose the Holocaust.113 
Part of the difficulty for the Court was in determining whether 
the commissioner(s) had an anti-religious bias that caused them to 
find Phillips in violation of Colorado law or whether, instead, the 
commissioners had reached that conclusion based on appropriate 
considerations. Perhaps the Court is suggesting that a 
commissioner’s having the sentiment that religion has sometimes 
played a negative role in history should be a basis for recusal, 
                                                                                                     
 109. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1729 (2018) 
 110. See Marsha B. Freeman, Holier Than You and Me: ‘Religious Liberty’ Is 
the New Bully Pulpit and Its New Meaning Is Endangering Our Way of Life, 69 
ARK. L. REV. 881, 895 (2017) (noting that “[r]eligion . . . [was] traditionally used 
to justify such abhorrent social platforms as slavery”). 
 111. See Alfred L. Brophy, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Critique of Slave Law in 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 12 J.L.& RELIGION 457, 504 (1995) (discussing “antislavery 
evangelical religion”). 
 112. Cf. Jocelyn Hellig, Antisemitism in Sub-Saharan Africa with a Focus on 
South Africa, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1197, 1202 (2000) (“The Holocaust of the 
Second World War was thus ‘the terminal expression of Christian 
anti-Semitism.’” (quoting RICHARD L. RUBENSTEIN, AFTER AUSCHWITZ: RADICAL 
THEOLOGY AND CONTEMPORARY JUDAISM 20 (1966))). 
 113. See Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury—A 
Government’s Weapon Against the Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 42 
(1986)  
During World War II, Jewish people fleeing the holocaust found refuge 
in monasteries where they were given food, shelter, and protective 
identification. One Protestant parish in Southern France, Le 
Chambon, declared itself a sanctuary and is credited with saving the 
lives of over three thousand Jewish people who found shelter there. 
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although one would wonder whether a commissioner who had the 
sentiment that religion has sometimes played a very positive role 
in history should also be a basis for recusal.114 
The commissioner’s comment that “it is one of the most 
despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their 
religion to hurt others”115 received a sharp rebuke from the 
Court.116 It was not clear whether the term “rhetoric” was used to 
suggest that the belief was “insincere.” 117 Nor was it clear whether 
the use of “despicable” was intended to communicate that the 
religious beliefs themselves were despicable. Perhaps the 
commissioner was expressing his frustration because he believed 
that religion was in this case resulting in harm118 when it often has 
beneficial effects,119 although use of the term “despicable” would 
not inspire public confidence in the commissioner’s objectivity.120 
In any event, as someone adjudicating rights, the commissioner 
simply should not be announcing that particular religious beliefs 
are good or bad, right or wrong.121 
The Court noted that the other commissioners did not object 
to those comments.122 Based on that failure to object, the Court 
                                                                                                     
 114. Cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729 (“The 
neutral . . . consideration to which Phillips was entitled was compromised here.”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. (“To describe a man’s faith as ‘one of the most despicable pieces of 
rhetoric that people can use’ is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct 
ways . . . .”). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Cf. Molly A. Gerratt, Closing A Loophole: Headley v. Church of 
Scientology International as an Argument for Placing Limits on the Ministerial 
Exception from Clergy Disputes, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 141, 182 (2011) 
(“[A] religion can cause harm to its own adherents or third parties . . . .”). 
 119. Cf. William P. Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 385, 386–87 (1996) (“[R]eligion is one of the 
most positive influences in society.”). 
 120. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1729 (2018) (suggesting that the commissioner’s comments reflected “a 
clear and impermissible hostility”). 
 121. Cf. Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory 
Religious Schools, 60 TEX. L. REV. 259, 261 (1982) (“A few churches 
conscientiously believe that God commands racial discrimination . . . . But such 
churches are protected in their beliefs; the free exercise clause protects unpopular 
churches as well as popular ones.”). 
 122. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729 (“The record shows no objection 
to these comments from other commissioners.”). 
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either attributed the same views to the Commission more 
generally or at least believed that the fairness and impartiality of 
the Commission was thereby seriously impugned.123 Needless to 
say, the Court has not always believed that an asserted view, if 
uncorrected by others, might reasonably be thought to reflect 
animus on the part of those making the assertion and those not 
complaining about it.124 
Members of civil rights commissions are on notice that such 
pronouncements will not be tolerated, and that they should not 
make comments that would create an appearance (or reflect an 
actuality) of partiality, especially in the context of rendering a 
decision.125 But the Court offered additional evidence of alleged 
partiality. 
After the administrative law judge (ALJ) had ruled in favor of 
Craig and Mullins, William Jack approached three different 
bakeries126 and asked them to make cakes with messages 
                                                                                                     
 123. See id. at 1730 (“[T]he Court cannot avoid the conclusion that these 
statements cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the Commission’s 
adjudication of Phillips’ case.”). 
 124. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (“To hold that 
the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would 
be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.”).Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 
(suggesting that there is “[n]o connection between family, marriage, or 
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other”), with 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“When sexuality finds overt 
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one 
element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”).The Court’s apparent 
willingness to condone orientation animus did not go unnoticed. See Watkins v. 
U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1453 (9th Cir.), superseded, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 
1988), withdrawn on reh’g, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting) (“The anti-homosexual thrust of Hardwick, and the Court’s 
willingness to condone anti-homosexual animus in the actions of the government, 
are clear.”). 
 125. Cf. Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 
2d 1006 (Miss. 2004) (refusing to sanction a judge who had expressed his views 
on the rights of gays and lesbians). The judge suggested that “homosexuals belong 
in mental institutions.” See id. at 1008. The court suggested that after this public 
pronouncement the judge might well face recusal motions. See id. at 1015 (“Judge 
Wilkerson will doubtless face a recusal motion from every gay and lesbian citizen 
who visits his court.”). 
 126. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“On March 13, 2014—approximately three months after the ALJ ruled in favor 
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conveying disapproval of same-sex unions.127 Justice Ginsburg 
explained in her dissent: 
He requested two cakes “made to resemble an open Bible. He 
also requested that each cake be decorated with Biblical verses. 
[He] requested that one of the cakes include an image of two 
groomsmen, holding hands, with a red ‘X’ over the image. On 
one cake, he requested [on] one side[,] . . . ‘God hates sin. Psalm 
45:7’ and on the opposite side of the cake ‘Homosexuality is a 
detestable sin. Leviticus 18:2.’ On the second cake, [the one] 
with the image of the two groomsmen covered by a red ‘X’ [Jack] 
requested [these words]: ‘God loves sinners’ and on the other 
side ‘While we were yet sinners Christ died for us. Romans 
5:8.’”128 
The bakers refused to make the cakes. Jack filed a complaint 
with the Civil Rights Commission and the Commission sided with 
the bakers.129 The Commission justified its decisions by noting that 
“the requested cake included ‘wording and images [the baker] 
deemed derogatory,’ featured ‘language and images [the baker] 
deemed hateful,’ or displayed a message the baker ‘deemed as 
discriminatory.’”130 
The Court believed that the Commission’s treatment of the 
bakers refusing Jack’s request provided a sharp contrast with the 
commission’s treatment of Phillips,131 and that the Commission’s 
siding with the bakers in Jack’s case was “[a]nother indication of 
hostility.”132 For example, the Court noted that the “Commission 
ruled against Phillips in part on the theory that any message the 
requested wedding cake would carry would be attributed to the 
                                                                                                     
of the same-sex couple, Craig and Mullins, and two months before the 
Commission heard Phillips’ appeal from that decision—William Jack visited three 
Colorado bakeries.”). 
 127. See id. at 1730 (“[O]n at least three other occasions the Civil Rights 
Division considered the refusal of bakers to create cakes with images that 
conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, along with religious text.”). 
 128. Id. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alterations in original). 
 129. See id. at 1730 (“Each time, the Division found that the baker acted 
lawfully in refusing service.”). 
 130. Id. (citations omitted). 
 131. See id. (“The treatment of the conscience-based objections at issue in 
these three cases contrasts with the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ 
objection.”). 
 132. Id. at 1730. 
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customer, not to the baker. Yet the Division did not address this 
point in any of the other cases with respect to the cakes depicting 
anti-gay marriage symbolism.”133 
Regrettably, the Court did not spell out what the Commission 
was doing or why the Court found it objectionable. When ruling 
against Phillips, the Commission had said that the message on the 
cake, if any, would be attributed to those who bought the cake 
rather than the baker.134 For example, if the cake had said, 
“Congratulations,” “Best Wishes,” or “Health and Happiness,” 
those seeing the cake would not think that Phillips was saying this 
but, instead, that the customer had commissioned it, perhaps 
assuming that those attending the wedding or reception had these 
positive thoughts in mind. If the cake did not have any words or 
symbols on it, the cake’s message of celebration would be 
attributed to those attending the wedding rather than to Phillips. 
The Commission’s identification of the individuals to whom the 
message would be attributed was likely in response to the (actual 
or anticipated) claim that Phillips did not want attributed to him 
these good wishes for the couple, because he did not approve of 
same-sex unions.135 
The Commission did not tell the bakers who refused to bake 
the cakes for Jack that the message of the cakes would not be 
attributed to them but, instead, to Jack. Yet, the bakers did not 
justify their refusal by saying that they feared that the message on 
the cake would be attributed to them but, instead, defended their 
refusals by saying that the message on the cake was “derogatory,” 
“hateful,” or “discriminatory.”136 But if the bakers refusing to bake 
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting that the Commission denied 
Mr. Phillips the choice of withholding his approval of the message the cake would 
send). 
 135. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762 (“This 
Court’s compelled-speech doctrine forbids the Commission from demanding that 
artists design custom expression that conveys ideas they deem objectionable.”). 
 136. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1730 (2018) (citations omitted). It might be noted that Phillips claimed that 
he would refuse to make a cake that was derogatory to gays and lesbians. See id. 
at 1745 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Phillips also refuses to bake cakes containing . 
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Jack’s cakes were not basing their refusals on their right not to be 
forced to send a message of which they disapproved but instead on 
their right not to create something offensive, then the Commission 
would of course not need to address the forced speech argument. 
The Commission might reasonably omit discussion of forced 
speech when that issue was not even raised, which means that the 
Commission had a reasonable, non-animus-based reason for 
including that discussion in the case involving Phillips but not in 
the cases involving Jack. But if there was a reasonable explanation 
for the Commission’s action, then the Court should not have 
treated this difference as an additional reason to attribute animus 
to the Commission.137 The Court suggested that “[a]t the time, 
state law also afforded shopkeepers some latitude to decline to 
create specific messages the storekeeper considered offensive.”138 
But the Commission should not be accused of bias simply because 
it applied state law in good faith, exempting individuals who 
refused to create objects containing specific, offensive messages 
but not exempting individuals who refused to create objects that 
did not contain messages at all, much less offensive ones. 
The Court offered another reason to believe that the 
Commission had an anti-religious bias. The Commission had found 
speech to have been involved in one case but not the other.139 Yet, 
Jack had requested cakes with particular words and symbols,140 
and Phillips had refused to make a cake even before any words or 
symbols had been discussed.141 For all Phillips knew, Craig and 
Mullins would not even have wanted a cake with words or symbols 
                                                                                                     
. . racist or homophobic messages.”). 
 137. See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) (“[W]e infer 
discriminatory animus because experience has proved that in the absence of any 
other explanation it is more likely than not that those actions were bottomed on 
impermissible considerations.”). 
 138. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728. 
 139. See id. at 1730 (“The treatment of the other cases and Phillips’ case could 
reasonably be interpreted as being inconsistent as to the question of whether 
speech is involved, quite apart from whether the cases should ultimately be 
distinguished.”). 
 140. Supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 141. See Brief for Petitioners at 12, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762 (“Craig 
and Mullins did not specify whether they wanted words or designs on their 
wedding cake . . . .”). 
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or even one that looked like a traditional wedding cake.142 
Suppose that a customer saw one of the cakes that Jack had 
requested in a bakery window. Next to it was a sheet cake with 
flowers on it. Might a reasonable person suggest that Jack’s cake 
was communicating a particular message while the other cake was 
not? It would seem difficult to miss the disapproval conveyed by 
Jack’s cake and difficult to impute a particular conveyed message 
by the sheet cake. Because a sheet cake without words or symbols 
“lack[s] the expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter, or the 
editorial page of a newspaper,”143 it would be reasonable to 
differentiate such a cake from Jack’s cake. 
Perhaps, though, baking a sheet cake (or selling one that has 
already made) for a wedding should at least be treated as 
expressive conduct.144 But someone who provided a sheet cake 
without symbols or writing for a same-sex wedding would not 
thereby be expressing a particular message—one would not even 
know whether the baker even knew that it was for a wedding.145 
But if that is so, then the Commission might rightly believe “that 
the conduct at issue here is not so inherently expressive that it 
warrants protection under O’Brien.”146 The Court has “rejected the 
                                                                                                     
 142. Phillips might have had a suspicion about what Craig and Mullins might 
want, but Phillips did not bother to find out. Cf. id. at 22  
Evidence indicates that Craig and Mullins intended to ask Phillips to 
design ‘a rainbow-layered [wedding] cake’ for them. In fact, that is the 
very cake that another cake artist later created for their wedding. 
Given the rainbow’s status as the preeminent symbol of gay pride, 
Craig and Mullins’s wedding cake undeniably expressed support for 
same-sex marriage. 
 143. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad.& Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006). 
 144. See Brief for Petitioners at 23, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762 (“Phillips’s 
creation of custom wedding cakes at least qualifies as a form of expressive 
conduct.”). 
 145. Cf. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66 
An observer who sees military recruiters interviewing away from the 
law school has no way of knowing whether the law school is expressing 
its disapproval of the military, all the law school’s interview rooms are 
full, or the military recruiters decided for reasons of their own that they 
would rather interview someplace else. 
 146. Id. (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). 
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view that “conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person 
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”147 
Further, even if it were known that the baker had understood that 
the cake would be used for a wedding, that would not justify 
imputing a view about the wedding to the baker, since the baker 
might be providing the cake so as to abide by the 
antidiscrimination law rather than because he approves of the 
wedding.148 
There was ample reason for the Civil Rights Commission to 
treat Jack’s cake as implicating speech and Phillip’s refusal to 
make any cake as not implicating speech, because for all Phillips 
knew the requested cake would have been indistinguishable from 
a cake that might have been served on any occasion. Suppose, 
though, that the Commission erred when treating Jack’s cake as 
expressive but not saying the same thing about the cake that 
Phillips refused to bake (even if it might merely have been a sheet 
cake with flowers). Even so, the Court went a step farther and 
imputed anti-religious bias to the Commission because it 
distinguished the cakes for First Amendment purposes.149 Here, 
too, such an imputation is inappropriate when there is a 
reasonable, nonbiased explanation for such differential treatment, 
even if ultimately the Commission should have decided these 
matters differently. 
The Court imputed animus to the Commission for yet another 
reason. The Commission had approved the ALJ’s finding that the 
bakers who had refused to bake the requested cake for Jacks were 
                                                                                                     
 147. Id. at 65–66 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). 
 148. Cf. id. at 65 (“We have held that high school students can appreciate the 
difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits 
because legally required to do so, pursuant to an equal access policy.” (citing 
Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schs. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 
250 (1990))). Apparently, Justice Thomas has a different reading of Rumsfeld. Cf. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Colorado 
Court of Appeals was wrong to conclude that Phillips’ conduct was not expressive 
because a reasonable observer would think he is merely complying with 
Colorado's public-accommodations law. This argument would justify any law that 
compelled protected speech. And, this Court has never accepted it.”). 
 149. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1730 (2018) (“The treatment of the other cases and Phillips’ case could 
reasonably be interpreted as being inconsistent as to the question of whether 
speech is involved, quite apart from whether the cases should ultimately be 
distinguished.”). 
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justified because the requested cake was “offensive,”150 whereas 
the Commission did not suggest that the cake requested of Phillips 
was also offensive. The Colorado Court of Appeals distinguished 
the Phillips case and the Jack cases by noting that “the Division 
found that the bakeries . . . refuse[d] the patron’s 
request . . . because of the offensive nature of the requested 
message.”151 Such a statement might mean that the message on 
the cake (the words and symbols) was objectively offensive or it 
might mean that the bakers themselves found the words and 
symbols offensive. If the intermediate appellate court was saying 
the former, then the court was committing error. “[T]he difference 
in treatment of these two instances cannot be based on the 
government’s own assessment of offensiveness,”152 because “it is 
not . . . the role of the State or its officials to prescribe what shall 
be offensive.”153 
Suppose, however, that the intermediate appellate court was 
simply saying that the bakers found the requested symbols or 
writing offensive and thus were refusing to bake such cakes for 
anyone.154 Phillips was saying that he found it offensive to make a 
wedding cake for Craig and Mullins, even though he might have 
made the same cake for someone else.155 If the intermediate 
                                                                                                     
 150. See id. at 1731 (“In those cases, the court continued, there was no 
impermissible discrimination because ‘the Division found that the 
bakeries  . . . refuse[d] the patron’s request . . . because of the offensive nature of 
the requested message.’”). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. (citing Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1762–64 (2017)). It is simply 
unclear whether the Court’s pronouncement has any implications for application 
of the Miller obscenity standard which requires a determination of “whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the applicable state law.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 154. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring)  
Jack requested them to make a cake (one denigrating gay people and 
same-sex marriage) that they would not have made for any customer. 
In refusing that request, the bakers did not single out Jack because of 
his religion, but instead treated him in the same way they would have 
treated anyone else—just as CADA requires. 
 155. See id. (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[T]he same-sex couple in this case 
requested a wedding cake that Phillips would have made for an opposite-sex 
couple.”). 
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appellate court was suggesting that the bakers viewed the Jack 
cakes, themselves, as offensive (and they would not make them for 
anyone) but that Phillips did not view the cake itself as offensive 
(because he would have made it for a different-sex couple), then 
the intermediate appellate court does not seem to be guilty of bias. 
Or, if the Commission is guilty of bias by suggesting that Phillips 
did not view the cake itself as offensive because he would not have 
objected to making it for a different-sex couple, then the Court also 
seems to be accusing Justices Kagan and Breyer of bias.156 
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court concluded: “The outcome of 
cases like this in other circumstances must await further 
elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing that 
these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue 
disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay 
persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an 
open market.”157 It is of course true that the jurisprudence will 
have to be worked out in the courts. However, due respect for 
sincerely held beliefs may require giving weight to a whole host of 
beliefs about the offensiveness of providing goods or services to 
particular people.158 Giving weight to such beliefs need not subject 
gay persons in particular to various indignities.159 Different people 
might find it offensive to provide goods or services to individuals of 
various races, nationalities, religions, etcetera.160 The Court seems 
to be opening the door to the imposition of indignities on a whole 
host of groups. 
Justice Gorsuch argues that the bakers’ refusal of Jack’s 
request and Phillips’s refusal of Craig and Mullins’s request were 
                                                                                                     
 156. See id. (Kagan, J. concurring) (making this distinction). 
 157. Id. at 1732. 
 158. Cf. id. at 1739 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (suggesting that religious beliefs 
about the offensiveness of providing wedding cakes to particular types of people 
must be given weight). 
 159. See id. at 1732 (discussing the need to resolve these disputes without 
“subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an 
open market”). 
 160. See Andrea A. Curcio, Addressing Barriers to Cultural Sensibility 
Learning: Lessons from Social Cognition Theory, 15 NEV. L.J. 537, 549 (2015) 
(“[A] significant portion of Americans have biases based upon a wide range of 
cultural factors such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, age, and 
sexual orientation.”). 
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comparable.161 Jack was refused service “because the cakes he 
sought were offensive to [the bakers’] own moral convictions.”162 
The bakers claimed that they “didn’t deny Mr. Jack service because 
of his religious faith,”163 offering two distinct reasons to support 
that claim: (1) “they treated Mr. Jack as they would have anyone 
who requested a cake with similar messages, regardless of their 
religion,” and (2) “they were happy to provide religious persons 
with other cakes expressing other ideas.”164 But, Justice Gorsuch 
believed, Phillips could have made the analogous claim.165 (1) “Mr. 
Phillips testified without contradiction that he would have refused 
to create a cake celebrating a same-sex marriage for any customer, 
regardless of his or her sexual orientation,”166 and (2) “Mr. Phillips 
offered to make other baked goods for the couple, including cakes 
celebrating other occasions.”167 Indeed, Justice Gorsuch argued 
that “the two cases share all legally salient features.”168 The 
customer was affected the same way in both cases: “bakers refused 
service to persons who bore a statutorily protected trait (religious 
faith or sexual orientation). But in both cases the bakers refused 
service intending only to honor a personal conviction.”169 
Yet, Justice Gorsuch’s gloss obscures some possibly important 
facets. Jack requested a cake with particular words and symbols 
but did not request it for a particular occasion.170 The bakers 
responded that they would make cakes with other religious words 
and symbols, which might have been appropriate for whatever 
                                                                                                     
 161. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1735 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (concluding that the customer 
received the same result in both cases). 
 162. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 163. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 164. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 165. See id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (discussing a lack of distinction in the 
two sets of facts). 
 166. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 167. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 168. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 169. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 170. See id. at 1734–35 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (describing how William 
Jack approached three separate bakers asking them to prepare cakes with anti 
same-sex messages). 
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occasion Jack wished to celebrate. Phillips refused to make any 
cake celebrating a same-sex union, so his offer to make other cakes 
for a different occasion would not be of much help.171 Indeed, it is a 
little surprising that Justice Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion 
rather than an opinion concurring in the judgment. The 
Masterpiece Cakeshop Court suggested that it would be a violation 
of the Colorado antidiscrimination law for a baker to refuse to bake 
any cake for a same-sex wedding,172 and Justice Gorsuch basically 
confirmed that Phillips would not bake any cake for a same-sex 
wedding.173 But if indeed the Court is correct about Colorado law 
and Justice Gorsuch is correct about Phillips’s policy, then the 
Court should have affirmed the decision below174 as harmless 
error,175 while chastising the Commission member(s) for having 
made inappropriate comments.176 
Suppose that Brittany comes into a bakery because she wants 
a wedding cake to be made. She will make all decisions about the 
cake because her betrothed, Lee, is out of the country (or otherwise 
                                                                                                     
 171. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1735 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (discussing Mr. Phillips interactions 
with Craig and Mullins and his offer to make the cakes celebrating something 
other than a same-sex wedding). 
 172. See id. at 1728 (discussing how a total denial of service would likely go 
beyond “any protected rights of a baker who offers goods and services to the 
general public”). 
 173. See id. at 1751 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Whatever one may think of 
the statements in historical context, I see no reason why the comments of one or 
two Commissioners should be taken to overcome Phillips’ refusal to sell a wedding 
cake to Craig and Mullins.”). 
 174. See id. at 1752 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[S]ensible application of 
CADA to a refusal to sell any wedding cake to a gay couple should occasion 
affirmance of the Colorado Court of Appeals' judgment. I would so rule.”). 
 175. Cf. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983) 
Supervisory power to reverse a conviction is not needed as a remedy 
when the error to which it is addressed is harmless since by definition, 
the conviction would have been obtained notwithstanding the asserted 
error. Further, in this context, the integrity of the process carries less 
weight, for it is the essence of the harmless error doctrine that a 
judgment may stand only when there is no “reasonable possibility that 
the [practice] complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” 
(quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86–87 (1963). 
 176. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1749 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[N]or do the comments by one or 
two members of one of the four decision-making entities considering this case 
justify reversing the judgment below.”). 
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occupied). The baker might refuse to make the cake under these 
conditions, believing in the importance of talking to both of the 
parties so that just the right cake could be made.177 But another 
baker might be willing to make such a cake without consulting 
both parties. 
Suppose that the requested cake is not to have writing or 
symbols. It is to be a traditional, three-tiered cake178 but there are 
to be no people on it, e.g., a bride and groom.179 The baker makes 
the cake and delivers it to the appropriate place on the appropriate 
day. 
What would this cake communicate? Justice Gorsuch writes 
that a “wedding cake without words conveys a message. Words or 
not and whatever the exact design, it celebrates a wedding, and if 
the wedding cake is made for a same-sex couple it celebrates a 
same-sex wedding.”180 In the hypothesized case, the traditional 
wedding cake might be taken to communicate “celebration,”181 
although one cannot tell whether this celebration involves a 
same-sex wedding or a different-sex wedding unless one knows 
whether Lee is a man or a woman. 
Consider a different-sex couple, Carla and David, who 
commission a three-tier, rainbow wedding cake. Here, the wedding 
cake is for a different-sex couple and thus (according to Justice 
Gorsuch) celebrates a different-sex wedding, although Phillips 
                                                                                                     
 177. See id. at 1742–43 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“Phillips is an active participant in the wedding celebration. He sits 
down with each couple for a consultation before he creates their custom wedding 
cake. He discusses their preferences, their personalities, and the details of their 
wedding to ensure that each cake reflects the couple who ordered it.”). 
 178. See Haley Holik, You Have the Right to Speak by Remaining Silent: Why 
a State Sanction to Create a Wedding Cake Is Compelled Speech, 28 REGENT U.L. 
REV. 299, 303 (2016) (discussing the tradition of a three-tiered wedding cake). 
 179. See Laura Krugman Ray, From the Bench to the Screen: The Woman 
Judge in Film, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 681, 713 (2012) (discussing “the wedding cake, 
complete with bride and groom”). 
 180. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 181. See id. at 1750 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“When a couple contacts a 
bakery for a wedding cake, the product they are seeking is a cake 
celebrating their wedding—not a cake celebrating heterosexual weddings or 
same-sex weddings.”). 
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might have refused to make the cake because he believed it 
communicated support for same-sex couples.182 Indeed, Carla and 
David might have ordered such a cake because they wished to 
communicate solidarity with same-sex couples who wished to 
marry, although they also might have ordered such a cake because 
they thought rainbow cakes were pretty. 
An individual who saw the rainbow cake in a bakery window 
might reasonably assume that the cake was communicating 
support for same-sex couples (even if in fact it was ordered because 
the couple believed that it would be pretty). This kind of cake might 
be thought analogous to the cakes requested by Jack in that those 
looking at the cakes might infer a message without knowing who 
ordered it, although the messages themselves are quite different. 
Both the rainbow cake and the cakes ordered by Jack are 
distinguishable from the possibly nondescript cake that Craig and 
Mullins might have requested.183 
A separate issue involves which of the cake-baking refusals 
either implicates the Colorado antidiscrimination law or triggers 
First Amendment protections. That issue should be resolved in 
light of a variety of factors. But it is a disservice to all to claim that 
there are no “legally salient” differences between a baker’s refusal 
to make a particular cake for anyone and a baker’s refusal to make 
a particular cake for some people even though he would have made 
that identical cake for someone else.184 
                                                                                                     
 182. See Brief for Petitioners at 22, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), 2017 WL 3913762 (“Given the rainbow’s 
status as the preeminent symbol of gay pride, Craig and Mullins's wedding cake 
undeniably expressed support for same-sex marriage.”); see also Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1735 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting that Phillips would 
not create a wedding cake celebrating a same-sex marriage for any customer).Of 
course, using Justice Gorsuch’s analysis, such a cake would not be celebrating a 
same-sex marriage because it was made for a different-sex wedding. Cf. id. at 
1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing that a wedding cake “celebrates a 
wedding, and if the wedding cake is made for a same-sex couple it celebrates a 
same-sex wedding”). 
 183. Justice Gorsuch does not seem to appreciate this. See Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1738–39 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[T]he Commission 
accepted the bakers’ view that the specific cakes Mr. Jack requested conveyed a 
message offensive to their convictions and allowed them to refuse service. Having 
done that there, it must do the same here.”). 
 184. Id. at 1735 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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III. The Future Implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop 
The Masterpiece Cakeshop holding is quite narrow, which 
means that the decision might not play a significant role in the 
development of the subsequent caselaw.185 However, the opinion 
includes numerous implicit and explicit suggestions about which 
factors might be relevant and how those factors might be treated 
in other cases involving claims of conscience.186 Further, some of 
the implicit doctrinal claims, if accepted, would have important 
implications in a variety of areas. It is thus important to explore 
some of the implicit and explicit arguments made in the opinion. 
A. What Constitutes Bias? 
There are several ways to read the Masterpiece Cakeshop 
analysis. On some readings, the opinion changes nothing. On 
others, however, there may be great changes in what counts as a 
neutral and respectful treatment of parties. 
Suppose that the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court was not 
confident that Phillips had refused to provide any baked goods for 
Craig and Mullins, possibly interpreting the offer to provide other 
baked goods (instead of a wedding cake) as intended to apply to 
goods for the reception rather than as an offer to sell baked goods 
for some other occasion.187 Suppose further that the “despicable” 
comment along with some of the other comments about religion 
and the marketplace sufficed to establish bias.188 In that event, the 
Commission decision might be thought appropriately vacated 
because of bias, and the rest of the opinion discussing factors that 
might be relevant189 could be dismissed as “random 
                                                                                                     
 185. See id. at 1732 (holding that the ruling of the Commission must be 
invalidated). 
 186. See id. at 1731–32 (discussing conscience-based objections). 
 187. See id. at 1724 (describing how Phillips offered several times to bake 
goods for any other type of event). 
 188. See id. at 1734 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[T]he only reason the 
Commission seemed to supply for its discrimination was that it found Mr. 
Phillips’s religious beliefs ‘offensive.’”). 
 189. See id. at 1723–24 (discussing the lack of neutrality in the Colorado Civil 
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judicial musing.”190 However, the decision need not be taken that 
way at all. 
The Court suggested that the “treatment of the other cases 
and Phillips’ case could reasonably be interpreted as being 
inconsistent as to the question of whether speech is involved, quite 
apart from whether the cases should ultimately be 
distinguished.”191 Because such an interpretation would be 
reasonable even if in fact incorrect, bias could be imputed.192 But 
this is a very low bar for imputing bias. 
Consider the cakes. One had writing and symbols on it while 
the other might have been a “generic cake.”193 The Court itself has 
compared cases where one case but not the other has “the 
expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter, or the editorial page 
of a newspaper.”194 No one denied the expressive quality of Jack’s 
requested cakes,195 whereas it might be much more difficult to 
attribute a particular message to a generic cake. But if that is so 
and it is nonetheless reasonable to impute bias, then many 
commission or judicial decisions will be subject to a charge of bias. 
Suppose that a three-tiered cake were used for a birthday 
celebration. Would such a cake nonetheless communicate 
celebration of a wedding?196 Would the cake’s message change if it 
had “Happy Birthday” written on the cake?197 
                                                                                                     
Rights Commission decision). 
 190. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & 
Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 
1643 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (saying “[n]o good can come 
of such random judicial musing”). 
 191. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1730 (2018). 
 192. See id. (“In short, the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ religious 
objection did not accord with its treatment of these other objections.”). 
 193. See supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text (discussing Brittany 
and Lee’s generic cake). 
 194. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006). 
 195. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730 (“[T]he Civil Rights 
Division considered the refusal of bakers to create cakes with images that 
conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, along with religious text.”). 
 196. See id. at 1743 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“If an average person walked 
into a room and saw a white, multi-tiered cake, he would immediately know that 
he had stumbled upon a wedding.”). 
 197. See Gilreath & Ward, supra note 58, at 243 n.27 (discussing the 
“communicative content . . . found in ‘happy birthday’ in frosting”). 
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Even if one accepts that a traditional, three-tiered wedding 
cake has inherent symbolism,198 that does not mean that a generic 
sheet cake used for a wedding would have that same symbolism. 
Just as cupcakes presumably do not have the inherent symbolism 
of a wedding cake, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s refusal to provide such 
baked goods for a same-sex couple notwithstanding,199 a generic 
sheet cake would not have that inherent meaning. 
If the Colorado intermediate appellate court was simply trying 
to follow Supreme Court precedent because the generic cake would 
require additional explanation for an observer to know its meaning 
while Jack’s requested cake would require no additional 
explanation,200 then it is difficult to understand why animus may 
reasonably be imputed to the court making that differentiation. 
Further, the Court has suggested in other contexts that when there 
is a charge of bias, the question that should be asked is whether 
there is a reasonable non-invidious explanation for what was done 
in which case animus would not be presumed.201 
After the Court’s issuance of its Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion, 
one hopes that fewer commission members will comment about 
whether they approve of particular religious beliefs. But if that is 
so, then the Court’s discussion of other bias indicators will be more 
important because it will be much more unlikely that there will be 
a “smoking gun”202 like the commissioner’s “despicable” 
comments.203 
                                                                                                     
 198. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1743 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(discussing “the inherent symbolism in wedding cakes”). 
 199. See id. at 1726 (discussing the shop’s policy of not selling cakes for 
same-sex weddings). 
 200. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66 (“The fact that such explanatory speech is 
necessary is strong evidence that the conduct at issue here is not so inherently 
expressive that it warrants protection under O’Brien.”). 
 201. See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) (“[W]e infer 
discriminatory animus because experience has proved that in the absence of any 
other explanation it is more likely than not that those actions were bottomed on 
impermissible considerations.”). 
 202. See Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 226 (1988) (discussing “the 
‘smoking gun’ of the memorandum or some other direct evidence of 
discrimination”). 
 203. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1729 (2018) (“To describe a man’s faith as ‘one of the most despicable pieces 
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The Court suggested that the Commission’s willingness to find 
that the bakers refusing to bake Jack’s requested cakes did not 
violate the antidiscrimination law coupled with the commission’s 
unwillingness to treat the Phillips case in the same way 
constituted bias, even though the bakers were objecting to the 
wording and images on the cake while Phillips was not.204 But the 
Court’s suggestion may be taken to suggest that a commission’s 
treating different cases differently205 may nonetheless reasonably 
be viewed as reflecting bias. 
The commissioners’ comments may have provided enough of a 
basis for a finding of bias that the Court’s other, more questionable 
bases for attribution of bias should be considered harmless error. 
But many cases in the future will likely not include prejudicial 
comments, and the Court’s suggestion that the application of 
current law is itself a basis for attributing bias is regrettable and 
must be disavowed at the earliest opportunity. 
B. Speech 
An important issue raised in Masterpiece Cakeshop involves 
the conditions, if any, under which a refusal to provide goods or 
services constitutes speech.206 The Court mentioned Phillips’s 
“belief that ‘to create a wedding cake for an event that celebrates 
something that directly goes against the teachings of the Bible, 
would have been a personal endorsement and participation in the 
ceremony and relationship that they were entering into.’”207 While 
the Court did not say whether Phillips’s making such a cake would 
in fact constitute compelled speech,208 the Court did comment: 
                                                                                                     
of rhetoric that people can use’ is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct 
ways: by describing it as despicable, and also by characterizing it as merely 
rhetorical—something insubstantial and even insincere.”). 
 204. See id. at 1730 (“For these reasons, the Court cannot avoid the conclusion 
that these statements cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the 
Commission’s adjudication of Phillips’ case.”). 
 205. See id. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[A] proper basis for 
distinguishing the cases was available—in fact, was obvious.”). 
 206. See id. at 1723 (discussing the free speech difficulties in this case). 
 207. Id. at 1724. 
 208. See id. at 1726 (“[Phillips] first asserted that applying CADA in a way 
that would require him to create a cake for a same-sex wedding would violate his 
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The free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few persons 
who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought of 
its creation as an exercise of protected speech. This is an 
instructive example, however, of the proposition that the 
application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can 
deepen our understanding of their meaning.209 
Regrettably, the Court gave little direction about whether or 
why this case constitutes a new context or in what ways our 
understanding of speech could or should be deepened.210 Many 
individuals may sincerely believe that certain actions would send 
a message that they are unwilling to send whether or not a 
reasonable person would infer that such a message was being 
sent.211 If the sincere belief that performance of a particular action 
would send a message suffices to make the action trigger First 
Amendment guarantees, then the state may well have a very 
difficult time requiring individuals to perform or, perhaps, refrain 
from performing a whole host of actions. For example, individuals 
might object to paying (some of) their taxes lest they be understood 
to be sending a message in favor of an immoral war.212 In any 
event, the Court has expressly rejected that one’s sincerely 
believing that the performance of an action would constitute 
sending a message will alone suffice to make such an action speech 
or even expressive conduct.213 Even one’s intending to send a 
                                                                                                     
First Amendment right to free speech by compelling him to exercise his artistic 
talents to express a message with which he disagreed.”). 
 209. Id. at 1723. 
 210. See id. at 1726 (discussing the constitutional speech claim Phillips made 
before a state administrative law judge). 
 211. But see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“In deciding whether 
particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First 
Amendment into play, we have asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that 
the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’” (citing Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974))). 
 212. See Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245, 268 (1934) 
(“The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse 
to contribute taxes in furtherance of a war, whether for attack or for defense, or 
in furtherance of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or 
immoral.”). 
 213. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (failing to allow 
for such a subjective approach to First Amendment analysis). 
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message by performing an action is not alone enough to make such 
an action speech or expressive conduct.214 
The Court does not provide a helpful way to limit what 
constitutes speech. Consider Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc.,215 which involved law schools who did not 
want to host military recruiters at a time when there was a ban on 
gays serving in the military.216 The Rumsfeld Court rejected that 
the law schools were being compelled to speak by hosting the 
military, reasoning that “accommodating the military’s message 
does not affect the law schools’ speech, because the schools are not 
speaking when they host interviews and recruiting 
receptions.”217 But the law schools believed that they were being 
forced to speak, even though “a law school’s decision to allow 
recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive.”218 
To make matters more confusing, the law schools did speak in 
an inherently expressive way by posting the time and place that 
the recruiters would meet with job-seekers.219 However, the Court 
reasoned, the law schools accommodating the military recruiters 
“does not affect the law schools’ speech,”220 in part because the law 
schools were not themselves restricted in what they “may say 
about the military’s policies”221 and in part because the law schools’ 
hosting the military (including saying where and when the 
recruiters would meet with students) did not constitute an 
endorsement of the military policy. “[S]tudents can appreciate the 
difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school 
permits because legally required to do so.”222 
                                                                                                     
 214. See id. (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety 
of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct 
intends thereby to express an idea.”). 
 215. 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 216. Id. at 51 (discussing Congress’s response to law schools’ restriction of 
military recruiters’ access to their campuses). 
 217. Id. at 64. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. at 61 (discussing emails and notices on notice boards). 
 220. Id. at 64. 
 221. Id. at 65. 
 222. Id. 
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Even if making a cake is inherently expressive,223 making a 
cake need not express the baker’s own view about the marriage or 
the suitability of the parties for each other. The baker can post 
signs that he does not approve of same-sex marriage if he is 
worried that the public might misunderstand his view.224 In any 
event, the public at large would presumably understand that the 
baker would not be giving his imprimatur of approval just by 
baking a cake if indeed he were legally required to do so.225 
In subsequent cases, the Court will have to decide which 
refusals to provide goods or services are expressive and therefore 
triggering First Amendment protections. While the Court rejects 
that the First Amendment requires “all purveyors of goods and 
services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious 
reasons . . . [to] be allowed to put up signs saying ‘no goods or 
services will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,’”226 the 
Court nowhere provides any way to limit the (possible) speech 
rights implicated and seems to reject one of the possible limiting 
principles.227 Many commercial entities might believe that 
providing goods or services for a wedding they do not support is 
offensive and communicates condonation or endorsement,228 even 
                                                                                                     
 223. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1742 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(“[C]reating and designing custom wedding cakes . . . is expressive.”). 
 224. See Andrew Jensen, Compelled Speech, Expressive Conduct, and 
Wedding Cakes: A Commentary on Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 147, 161 (2018) 
(“[A] baker could declare his moral opposition to same-sex unions by placing 
a sign in the shop window or stating his view to customers, while still baking 
cakes for those weddings.”). 
 225. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (2018) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Court of 
Appeals . . . reasoned that an outside observer would think that Phillips was 
merely complying with Colorado's public-accommodations law, not expressing a 
message.”). 
 226. Id. at 1728–29. 
 227. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad.& Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 
(2006) (discussing how the analysis changes when the conduct is required by law). 
 228. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Speech or Conduct? The Free Speech Claims 
of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J. 241, 249–50 (2015) (“Every objecting baker, 
florist, and photographer who refuses to provide services for a same-sex ceremony 
resists sending a particular message, namely, ‘I endorse or condone same-sex 
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if they do not wish to send a message that the participants in the 
wedding are second-class citizens.229 The Court neither provides or 
even suggests a way to distinguish among such claims so that only 
certain providers would be able to refuse to sell their goods or 
services without violating antidiscrimination laws. On the 
contrary, the Court’s attribution of bias to the Commission when 
it accepted one offensiveness defense but not another illustrates 
that attempts to justify preferring some refusals over others would 
be viewed “with skepticism, if not a jaundiced eye.”230 
C. Free Exercise 
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court suggests that Phillips’s free 
exercise rights were violated.231 That violation involved the 
commission’s allegedly having failed “to proceed in a manner 
neutral toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs.”232 But 
the decision did not “vindicate[] Phillips’ right to free exercise,” 
where that would be understood to mean that Phillips would be 
immunized from prosecution for violating the Colorado 
antidiscrimination law.233 Indeed, were Phillips to refuse to sell 
any baked goods now to a same-sex couple celebrating their 
                                                                                                     
weddings.’ For them, creating a cake or taking a picture . . . conveys approval of 
that union, an approval they do not wish to bestow.”); Angela C. Carmella, When 
Businesses Refuse to Serve for Religious Reasons: Drawing Lines Between 
“Participation” and “Endorsement” in Claims of Moral Complicity, 69 RUTGERS U. 
L. REV. 1593, 1607 (2017) (“They argue that to require them to provide wedding 
goods and services to same-sex couples forces them to endorse, even celebrate, 
same-sex marriage in violation of their right not to be coerced to speak the 
government's message and their right to religious conscience.”). 
 229. See Kathleen A. Brady, The Disappearance of Religion from Debates 
About Religious Accommodation, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1093, 1113 (2017) 
(“Conservative believers do not necessarily think that they are sending such 
a message [i.e., that gays and lesbians are not full and equal members of society] 
when they refuse to provide wedding services to same-sex couples.”). 
 230. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873 (1994). 
 231. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1724 (2018) (“[T]he Commission's actions here violated the Free Exercise 
Clause.”). 
 232. Id. at 1731. 
 233. Justice Thomas seems to obscure this point. See id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Phillips rightly prevails on 
his free-exercise claim . . . .”). 
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marriage, the Court implied that he could be prosecuted both 
because a baker’s blanket refuse to provide such products was 
illegal before234 and because same-sex marriage is now recognized 
in Colorado when it was not before.235 
Nonetheless, some parts of the opinion suggest that there may 
be changes to free exercise jurisprudence. Justice Gorsuch may be 
suggesting that Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith236 should be revisited.237 Other 
justices have suggested the same thing in other decisions in the 
past.238 Even if the Court does not reconsider Smith, however, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop might be interpreted to undermine Smith in 
important ways. 
Smith suggests that “the right of free exercise does not relieve 
an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral 
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes 
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).’”239 However, the Supreme Court has also made clear 
that “the government . . . cannot act in a manner that passes 
judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs 
and practices.”240 In the case before the Masterpiece Cakeshop 
Court, the Commission was “obliged under the Free Exercise 
Clause to proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of 
Phillips’ religious beliefs.”241 
                                                                                                     
 234. See id. at 1728. 
 235. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text (discussing the change in 
same-sex marriage law since Phillips refused to sell a cake to Craig and Mullins). 
 236. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012), as 
recognized in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
 237. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1734 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Smith remains controversial in 
many quarters.”). 
 238. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 565 (1997) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“I believe that it is essential for the Court to reconsider its holding 
in Smith . . . .”). 
 239. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 
(1982)). 
 240. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731. 
 241. Id. 
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That obligation to proceed neutrally must be unpacked. The 
Commission treated the cake-baking refusals differently because 
Jack’s requested cakes had a clear message, whereas Phillips did 
not even wait to find out whether Craig and Mullins’s cake would 
have a clear message.242 For all that Phillips knew, the cake that 
they were requesting would be indistinguishable from any number 
of cakes that might be requested to celebrate any number of 
occasions.243 If treating these different kinds of refusals differently 
nonetheless constituted a discriminatory application of the 
Colorado antidiscrimination law,244 then free exercise rights may 
become quite robust (even if Smith is not overruled), because 
recognition of any exceptions will require recognizing multiple 
exceptions.245 
Consider Sherbert v. Verner,246 which involved whether the 
state of South Carolina could deny unemployment benefits to an 
individual who could not work on Saturday because of her religious 
beliefs.247 The Sherbert Court held that the denial of 
unemployment benefits was a violation of free exercise 
guarantees.248 
Suppose that a different South Carolinian is precluded from 
working on Saturday because she cannot get childcare for her 
                                                                                                     
 242. See id. 1732–33 (Kagan, J., concurring) (stating that the Commission 
determined the differences between the two cases were that Jack’s refusals were 
based on the offensive nature of the cake’s message). 
 243. See id. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring) (arguing that Phillips withheld 
“the full and equal enjoyment” of his business on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 244. See id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he discriminatory 
application of Colorado’s public-accommodations law is enough on its own to 
violate Phillips’ rights.”). 
 245. See id. at 1727 (arguing that a long list of exceptions would result in a 
possible “community-wide stigma”). 
 246. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 247. See id. at 399–400 (“When she was unable to obtain other employment 
because from conscientious scruples, she would not take Saturday work, she filed 
a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina 
Unemployment Compensation Act.”); see also id. at 401 (“The appellee 
Employment Security Commission, in administrative proceedings under the 
statute, found that appellant’s restriction upon her availability for Saturday work 
brought her within the provision disqualifying for benefits insured workers who 
fail, without good cause, to accept ‘suitable work when offered’ . . . .”). 
 248. See id. at 410 (“Our holding today is only that South Carolina may not 
constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to 
abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest.”). 
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children on that day, and she has a moral (and legal) duty to make 
sure that her children have proper supervision.249 Would the 
recognition of Sherbert’s right to receive unemployment 
compensation also require the state to give unemployment 
compensation to the parent who is trying to fulfill her parental 
duties? 
The answer might depend upon whether religious duties are 
viewed as on a par with non-religious duties or, instead, as 
requiring more protection than non-religious duties.250 If they are 
on a par, then just as the State cannot punish someone for fulfilling 
her duty to observe the Sabbath, a state cannot punish someone 
for fulfilling her duty to supervise her children.251 But even if 
religious duties are preferred, it would be unsurprising for many 
to believe that they have a religious duty to make sure that their 
children are adequately supervised.252 
So, too, it is unclear whether the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court 
considers what is religiously offensive as equivalent to what is 
“offensive to . . . secular convictions,”253 although the Court 
cautions against “elevat[ing] one view of what is offensive over 
another,”254 at least in part because “the role of the State or its 
                                                                                                     
 249. See Mark Strasser, Free Exercise and Substantial Burdens Under 
Federal Law, 94 NEB. L. REV. 633, 653 (2016) (comparing “those who ‘chose’ not to 
work for compelling reasons such as the need to be home at certain times to care 
for children or to avoid working on the Sabbath”). 
 250. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
[T]he implications of the present decision are far more troublesome 
than its apparently narrow dimensions would indicate at first 
glance . . . . [T]he State, in other words, must single out for financial 
assistance those whose behavior is religiously motivated, even though 
it denies such assistance to others whose identical behavior (in this 
case, inability to work no Saturdays) is not religiously motivated. 
 251. See id. at 422–23 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining the concept of 
constitutional neutrality). 
 252. See id. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the presence of 
religious motivation creates an exception for behavior that would generally not 
be eligible for financial assistance). 
 253. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1735 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 254. Id. at 1731. 
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officials [is not] to prescribe what shall be offensive.”255 But if what 
is morally offensive or, perhaps, what is offensive to conscience 
(whether religious or secular) must be given an exemption if any 
exemptions are granted (unless strict scrutiny can be met), then 
Masterpiece Cakeshop may be signaling a new day with respect to 
the kinds of exemptions that the state will have to grant to laws 
(assuming that any exceptions are granted at all).256 
D. Antidiscrimination Laws 
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court affirmed that states can have 
and enforce antidiscrimination laws.257 “It is unexceptional that 
Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other 
classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services 
they choose on the same terms and conditions as are offered to 
other members of the public.”258 However, the decision may well 
bode poorly for the application of antidiscrimination laws to 
refusals to provide goods or services, as long as those refusals 
qualify as communicating a message.259 Depending upon how the 
Court delimits the kind of actions (or refusals) that are treated as 
communicating a message, this limitation on antidiscrimination 
law may create “the gaping exception that 
nearly swallows the rule.”260 If a commercial entity is viewed as 
communicating a message whenever it refuses to provide a good or 
service because of a sincere desire not to support a particular 
                                                                                                     
 255. Id. 
 256. See id. at 1745–46 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Because Phillips’ conduct 
(as described by the Colorado Court of Appeals) was expressive, Colorado’s 
public-accommodations law cannot penalize it unless the law withstands strict 
scrutiny.”). 
 257. See id. at 1728 (implying that states can enact and enforce 
antidiscrimination laws). 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. (“In this context the baker likely found it difficult to find a line 
where the customers’ right to goods and services became a demand for him to 
exercise the right of his own personal expression for their message, a message he 
could not express in a way consistent with his religious beliefs.”). 
 260. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant 
Rights & Fight for Equal.by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1646 (2014). 
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practice or group, then almost any business might qualify for an 
exemption.261 
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court cited Matal v. Tam262 with 
approval.263 The Matal Court suggested, “[S]peech that demeans 
on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or 
any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our 
free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express 
‘the thought that we hate.’”264 The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court’s 
having pointed to a section of the Matal opinion containing the 
passage above is alarming. The Court may be suggesting that 
various kinds of refusals to sell products or services qualify as 
speech and that hateful speech must be permitted, which means 
that antidiscrimination laws will be easy to circumvent by talking 
about why one’s refusal to serve particular individuals (of the 
wrong kind) in the marketplace constitutes speech.265 
Many people understand that a refusal to provide goods and 
services is insulting,266 demeaning,267 and might be taken to mean 
that the person refused is not a full and equal citizen.268 Further, 
                                                                                                     
 261.  Mark Strasser, Speech, Association, Conscience, and the First 
Amendment's Orientation, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 495, 530 (2014) (“[M]ost if not all 
businesses would seem permitted to refuse to provide services so that they could 
avoid sending an undesired message.”). 
 262. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 263. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1731 (2018) (“A principled rationale for the difference in treatment of these 
two instances cannot be based on the government’s own assessment of 
offensiveness.”). 
 264. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (citing United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 
644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 265. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1737–38 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (listing examples of what is considered neutral religious treatment). 
 266. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism, Democracy, and Deep Disagreement: 
Decentralizing Baseline Disputes in the Law of Religious Liberty, 69 ALA. L. REV. 
913, 967 (2018) (discussing the “insulting message conveyed by a refusal to 
serve”). 
 267. Cf. Steven J. Heyman, A Struggle for Recognition: The Controversy over 
Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and Same-Sex Marriage, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
1, 121 (2015) (“[I]t is demeaning to know that some providers 
will refuse to serve you because of your identity . . . .”). 
 268. Cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (“Our society has come to 
the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social 
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lest there be any doubt in the would-be buyer’s mind about the 
message communicated by the refusal to sell, the refusing seller 
could make the message quite clear. 
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court may be endorsing a kind of 
equal opportunity discrimination.269 The government cannot 
prescribe what is offensive and cannot “elevate[] one view of what 
is offensive over another, . . . [which would] itself send[] a signal of 
official disapproval . . . .”270 One person’s view of offensiveness 
cannot be given greater weight than another’s, and “government 
has no role in deciding or even suggesting whether . . . [a] ground 
for . . . conscience-based objection is legitimate or 
illegitimate.”271 Such an approach would suggest that granting one 
exemption for offensiveness requires granting exemptions to 
anyone who would be offended by entering into a commercial 
transaction with a member of a particular group.272 A policy 
implementing this approach could severely limit, if not “sound[] a 
potential death knell[,] for a panoply of [antidiscrimination] 
statutes.”273 
IV. Conclusion 
The Masterpiece Cakeshop Court issued a narrow holding that 
seemed to affirm free exercise rights while also affirming the right 
of same-sex couples to marry.274 However, many of the implicit 
claims about which factors are relevant and what roles those 
factors may play in future cases implicating conscience suggest 
that future decisions about these and related matters will be 
                                                                                                     
outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.”). 
 269. Id.; cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (“St. Paul has 
no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring 
the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”). 
 270. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731. 
 271. Id. 
 272. See id. at 1732 (“In this case the adjudication concerned a context that 
may well be different going forward in the respects noted above.”). 
 273. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 628 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
 274. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1723 (2018) (stating that this case presents difficult questions about 
governmental entities’ authority to prevent discrimination and free speech). 
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contentious and will lead to the kind of society that many might 
prefer not to have.275 
The Court seems to open the door to discrimination against a 
variety of groups on the basis of race, religion, orientation, 
etcetera, as a matter of First Amendment guarantees.276 
Individuals who in good conscience (whether religious or secular) 
do not wish to condone or support a variety of groups may express 
those sincere convictions in a way that will lead to a less civil 
society for all. Even if the Court adopts a preferentialist view of 
religious conscience (privileging religious conscience over secular 
conscience), many individuals might sincerely claim that their 
religious or spiritual beliefs require them not to do business with 
any number of types of individuals, and the Court may have 
provided a framework for immunizing actions based on such 
beliefs.277 
Masterpiece Cakeshop need not lead to such a dystopian result. 
The decision may simply be viewed as involving a limited holding 
that directs decisionmakers not to manifest prejudice towards any 
of the parties before them.278 However, the decision may also be a 
harbinger of decisions to come that will make society a less 
welcoming place for everyone, regardless of race, religion, 
orientation, gender, nationality, etc. One can only hope that the 
Court will recognize where some lines of reasoning lead and do its 
best to prevent adoption of interpretations and practices that are 
insupportable as a matter of constitutional law or good public 
policy. 
                                                                                                     
 275. See id. at 1732 (stating that future similar cases must be resolved 
individually based on their context). 
 276. See id. (“The Commission’s hostility was inconsistent with the First 
Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral 
towards religion.”). 
 277. See id. (stating that full and fair consideration must be given to religious 
objections). 
 278. See id. (“Phillips was entitled to a neutral decisionmaker . . . .”). 
